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IN THE UTAH COURT in- AlM'hAL S 
S I U F O F i r n i f • : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20030080-CA 
v. : 
• ^ S F P P \f \K \ T -wni : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF'" 'APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF i n h i - - • '••• i 
This is an appeal from convictions of two counts of aegnvated mhhpn. first degree 
felonies, lr n of Utat * .<**.
 M* . § 76-6-302 ,uuk al District 
Honorable - -
presiding. I his vourt has iun-dK'tiur. under I uih l ode \nr ; S-2a-3(2)(j) ( Jonj). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
1 Whethei thi^ Com I c r uaenda.;i i s patently meritless claims 
eht of ov* -" ; i f % , n ! r > 
,A ;r: - iute court may decline to const u:\ • • •. merits of a claim, where it is clear that 
in i ' inn 'i. iilliil II " lii i i inii 'ss ill lifjhl I  i I iM hrhnni).' n nilnn c ( uuilt \t\itr i I  IWW/L; " ' '' 
P.2d 327, 345 ( Utah 1993) I citations omm. _,. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301, -302 (1999); 
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Joseph Maka Langi, was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, 
both counts subject to an enhanced penalty for acting in concert with two or more persons 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1999) (R. 2-4). Following a jury trial that concluded 
on April 26,2001, defendant was convicted of both counts of aggravated robbery and the in-
concert ("gang") offenses (R. 170-71). On May 31, 2001, before the trial court sentenced 
him, defendant filed a motion for a new trial (R. 181-83, 193-201). On June 11, 2001, the 
trial court sentenced defendant to two five-to-life terms, to be served concurrently in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 190-01). Additionally, the court imposed on defendant's sentences a 
minimum nine-year term under the gang enhancement (R. 185, 191; 325:15). Defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing (R. 181-83; 262-70; 
326:3-17). Defendant filed a notice of appeal (R. 315-16). The Utah Supreme Court 
2 
transferred the case to this court, under I Itali Code Ann § 78-2-2(4) < 200J I n< '. I8it,!i 
j . . r . ' - 190). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Trial Testimony 
Rachel Redding were pla> ing cards at Rachel's grandmother's house (R, 323:136; 324:15 \ 
Wanting to get something to eat, they drove to Beto's restaurant in Kcams,, arriv ing there at 
1
 Although the procedural background of the case set out above is somewhat 
oversimplified, this Court has not been deprived of jurisdiction. On May 31, 2001, before 
the trial court sentenced him, defendant filed a motion for a new trial (R. 181-83, 193-
201). On June 11, 2001, the trial court sentenced defendant, but the signed final order 
was not formally entered (R. 190-01). 
On September 7, 2001, the trial court heai d cl sfei idant's new trial motion and 
orally denied it (R. 326:3-17) On March 14, 2002, the trial court entered an order 
denying defendant's motion (R 262-270), On \pril 10, 2002, newly appointed defense-
counsel filed a notice of appeal, which purported to effect an appeal from the "judgment 
and conviction filed and entered by [the trial court] on April 26, 2001, and all other post 
trial motions, including but not limited to, [the trial court's] findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and order re: defendant's motion for a new trial[,] filed on March 15, 
2002" (R. 272). 
On September 19, this Court issued a sua sponte motion for summary disposition 
(R. 313-14). The Court held that although the district court docket reflected that 
defendant was sentenced on June 11, 2001, no signed judgment appeared in the record 
transmitted to the Court (R. 314). Therefore, the Court held that it lacked junsdiction 
over the appeal (R. 314). The Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, allowing 
defendant to file a timely notice of appeal after the entry of a final judgment (R 314) \ 
final judgment was entered on November 5, 2002, and defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal on November 26, 200* " "06-09, 315- 16) 
i!:
 I he facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in i . .* 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Boyd, 2001 I J I 30, | 2 , 25 P.3d 985. 
3 
1:56 a.m. (R. 323:110-11, 136, 142; VT. 1:56:22).3 Gabriel entered the restaurant first, 
followed by Rachel and Jose (R. 323:111; VT. 1:56:22-27). Jose wore an eyebrow ring (R. 
323:137). Jose had his wallet with him when he entered the restaurant (R. 323:136). Gabriel 
also had his wallet, which had about $80, "information" papers, and a driver's license in it 
(R. 324:158, 164, 174). Gabriel walked to a table, while Rachel and Jose approached the 
counter to get something to eat (R. 323:111; VT. 1:56:27-36). After placing their order, 
Rachel and Jose returned to a booth near Gabriel (R. 323:112-13; VT. 1:59:20-2:00:20). 
Approximately twenty minutes later, defendant, Konai Bloomfield, and Siaosi 
"George" Afu arrived at the restaurant (R. 323:113-14).4 Afu entered the restaurant first, 
followed by Bloomfield and then defendant (R. 323:114-15; 324:185; VT. 2:23:19-30). Afu 
walked directly to the booth where Rachel and Jose sat, shook Jose's hand, and said, 
3
 The surveillance videotape, State's exhibit 3, is a true and accurate copy of the 
videotape collected from Beto's on February 26, 2000 (R. 323:75-76). That videotape 
was played for the jury (R. 323: 109-10). As it played, Detective Jeffrey Lone explained 
that the videotape depicted a split-screen image recorded by four surveillance cameras 
(R. 323:110). Jose, Gabriel, and Rachel also testified in accord with the videotape 
depiction of events. The numeric counter of videotape, superimposed on the image, is 
cited as "VT:hour:minute:second." 
Detective Lone used the videotape to identify the victims: Gabriel, with "longer" 
hair, wearing black clothes and a light-colored shirt, entered the restaurant first (R. 
323:111). He was followed by Rachel, who wore a light top and dark pants (R. 323:111). 
Jose, who entered behind Rachel, wore a checkered jacket (R. 323:111). Just before 
defendant and his companions entered the restaurant, Jose removed his jacket, revealing a 
light-colored shirt (R. 323:114). 
4
 Detective Lone, with the aid of the videotape, also identified defendant and his 
two companions: Afu entered the restaurant first, followed by Bloomfield and then 
defendant (R. 323:114). Bloomfield wore a short-sleeved white shirt (R. 323:114-15). 
Defendant wore a dark jacket (R. 323:115). By the time of trial, Bloomfield had already 
been convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery with an in-concert enhancement, and 
Afii had pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony (R. 263). 
4 
"Everything is cool \ V e are just here to get something to eat'" (1 1 323, 11 1 15; 324:181 82 
323:115-16; VT. 2:23:49). Soon afterward, Rachel and Jose walked t : till: le drink machines 
to fill their drinks (R. 323:116; » I 2:25:2 ) ), AsBloc m: :i ifi i I :ii: e ::: i\ ed his change, defendant 
i i \m edbehinc *hrie!(F 
which hit the -ash register hard enough u* Knr K »• • . . r v and ea \e !< ^-
unconscious (F ^ 2 V H . •.- » w-26w3i .^. .w*. 
I iiii I in n i n e l e d I n 
i I t the same instant, defendant began to rain blow after blow with his fists on Gabriel 's head 
(R 323:117; 324:188-89, 192; VT. 2:26:01.02). At this point, Afo left (VT. 2:26:25). 
pockets (R. 323:117; VT. 2:26:26-38). Detective Lone "'••I *s cleanly ODVIOUS 
on the video" (R 323:117). Defendant then stomped on Jose 's head, walked to Gabriel 's 
Deputy J ason Huggard shortly after the robbery that three men had assaulted her two friends 
and taken "stuff' from their pockets (R. 323:92 ,99 ,118) . Consistent with that statement, she 
testified at trial lliuil I wo < >i lllllii < I lici li iciicL' assailant,:.) seaicJicd boili J i .c" s • 11 J« l < id hi w III' . 
pockets. She did not see anything removed from Jose 's pockets, but she did see something 
come out of Gabriel 's pockets, although she could not say that it was a wallet (R. 324:193, 
195) !l"k i u, however, who testified for both, the prosecution and the defense, consistently 
repc rted. first to Detective I one, then at trial, ai id tl lereafter when, investigated for perjury. 
5 
that he saw defendant throw a wallet from the car during the getaway (R. 227-29, 323:125-
126, 132-33; 324:202, 204-06, 218). 
Defendant and Bloomfield then exited the restaurant, got in a vehicle with Afu, and 
drove away. Seconds later, one of the restaurant clerks pressed the alarm (R. 323:117-18; 
VT. 2:27:03-06). Detective Huggard arrived six minutes later, at 2:33 am (R. 323:68-70, 
102, 118). He found Jose unconscious on the floor in front of the counter (R. 323:70-72). 
He also found Gabriel slumped on a seat next to a table, conscious, but incoherent. There 
was a large pool of blood under the table and in the booth in which he lay (R. 323:72-73). 
Gabriel appeared to have a broken jaw, his teeth were chipped and broken, he had a cut 
beneath his chin, and his face was swollen (R. 323:78-80, 108; 324:161-62). A row of 
Gabriel's teeth were later found on the restaurant floor (R. 323:81-82). 
Jose and Gabriel were taken to Pioneer Valley Hospital (R. 323:77). When Gabriel 
awoke in the hospital the following morning, he did not have either the wallet or the $80 (R. 
R 324:161,163-64). Gabriel reported the missing wallet and money stolen, but he never did 
get either the wallet or the money back (R. 324:164,167). He was in bed for eight days after 
the incident and for the next twenty-two days could only take liquids (R. 324:163). At trial, 
fourteen months after the incident, scars from the injuries received in the beating still 
bothered Gabriel and his jaw still felt crooked (R. 324:161-63). 
At trial, Jose could only recall awakening in the hospital the following morning with 
a headache and an IV in his arm (R. 323:137-38). His face was bruised and he had stitches 
6 
on the side of his head (R. 323:138-39; State's Ex. 8). At least four months after he was 
beaten, Jose still suffered headaches and had difficulty sleeping (R. 323:145). 
Facts related to impeachment of Afu, alleged Bruton violation, and new trial motion 
Detective Lone interviewed Afii about a month after the robbery (R. 323:103,107-08, 
132-33). During the interview, Afii told him that defendant had thrown the wallet from the 
getaway vehicle as it passed 5400 South, in the vicinity of a church (R. 323:125-126, 132-
33). Detective Lone looked for the wallet several days later, but was unable to find it (R. 
323:126). 
At trial, Afu appeared for the prosecution (R. 324:202). He initially backpedaled on 
statements he made to Detective Lone during the interview (R. 324:204). However, when 
confronted with the transcript of the interview, first to impeach him and then to refresh his 
memory, Afu affirmatively testified that he recalled telling the detective that defendant had 
a wallet in his hand when he got into the getaway car and that he later threw the wallet out 
of the car (R. 324:204-06). 
Following his conviction, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that Afu 
perjured himself at trial (R. 181-83,193-97). The motion was supported by Afii's notarized 
affidavit, which alleged that he had been pressured by the prosecutor and the investigator to 
lie during his interview with Detective Lone in exchange for favorable treatment and that he 
did not see defendant take or steal anything (R. 199). 
The prosecutor's opposing memorandum noted that Afu admitted at trial that he had 
given statements to the police that were inconsistent with his trial testimony and that he had 
7 
even lied to detectives (R. 210). However, Afu never alleged in the affidavit that he had lied 
under oath (R. 199,210). 
To determine if Afu had perjured himself, Sergeant Kevin Judd of the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney's Office interviewed Afu, who was accompanied by his counsel (R. 
210, 218-33). That investigation quickly revealed the following facts: (1) the affidavit was 
presented to Afu by Sam Misini, defendant's uncle (R. 221-23); (2) Afu could barely read 
(R. 218, 221); (3) Afu's wife read the affidavit, giving him the gist of its meaning (R. 218, 
223-24); (4) Afu signed the affidavit, believing that it attested to his having lied to Detective 
Lone only about his involvement and his relation to defendant, but not that he had lied about 
the specific events of the crime or while under oath (R. 218-19,222,225-27); and (5) neither 
the police nor the prosecutor ever pressured him to testify in any particular way (R. 218-19, 
226-27,231 -32). Afu asserted to Sergeant Judd that he never lied to Detective Lone or while 
on the stand, that defendant "had the wallets and threw [them] out." Afu admitted that he did 
lie, however, when, to protect defendant's identity, he told the detective that he had let 
defendant out at the church when defendant had actually slept at Afu's house that night (R. 
227-29, 232). 
The trial court reviewed the parties' memoranda and heard argument on defendant's 
motion (R. 326:3-17). The trial court denied defendant's new trial motion because defendant 
could have discovered those matters Afu admitted lying about before trial, defendant failed 
to show Afu lied at trial, defense counsel sufficiently cross-examined Afu at trial on 
8 
inconsistencies in his statements, and the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt made 
any error harmless (R. 268-70; 326:15-17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's five claims of error on appeal all seek to undermine the taking-of-
personal-property element of aggravated robbery through a variety of legal theories by 
arguing that the wallets alleged to have been stolen from the victims never existed. This 
Court may reasonably decline to consider any of defendant's claims because the videotape 
and the undisputed testimony of an eyewitness show that defendant attempted to deprive the 
victims of personal property by going through their pockets. This was all that was necessary 
to prove the offenses in this case. Additionally, defendant's claims are patently without 
merit. They are variously based on unjustifiable readings of the record, arguments 
specifically rejected under the invited error doctrine, and long-defunct law in direct 
contradiction to current legal rules. 
ARGUMENT 
IN LIGHT OF THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO 
SERIOUSLY CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S PATENTLY MERITLESS 
CLAIMS OF ERROR FOUNDED ON LESS-THAN-CANDID 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE RECORD 
Defendant asserts five distinct legal claims of error on appeal. Each claim attempts 
to undermine evidence that defendant stole the victims' wallets. Defendant's assault on the 
existence of the wallets to defeat the taking-of-personal-property element of aggravated 
9 
robbery is a red herring, which deflects the Court's consideration of a prosecution theory that 
is immediately conclusive of defendant's guilt. 
First, as the prosecution argued in closing, whether or not the victims even possessed 
the wallets was unnecessary for conviction since a mere attempt to commit a robbery while 
causing serious bodily injury is sufficient to prove aggravated robbery. In this case, 
defendant's infliction of serious bodily injury on Jose and Gabriel is unchallenged. More 
importantly, evidence of defendant's attempt to rob the victims' of personal property was 
overwhelming. 
Second, defendant's claims are patently without merit. They are variously based on 
unjustifiable readings of the record, arguments specifically rejected under the invited error 
doctrine in State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,63 P.3d 110, and long-defunct law in direct 
contradiction to current legal rules. The Court should decline to seriously to consider any 
of defendant's claims because their resolution could not affect the outcome of the case and 
would constitute a waste of judicial resources. 
A. Because evidence of defendant's attempt to commit 
a robbery was overwhelming, the Court need not 
consider the merits of defendant's specific claims. 
"[F]or an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high and undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict." State v. Young, 853 
P.2d 327,345 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Therefore, an appellate court may decline to 
consider the merits of a claim where it is clear that any error would be harmless in light of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. (declining to consider various claims of erroneous 
10 
admission of evidence where the prosecution put on substantial evidence of guilt, including 
the defendant's taped confession). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), the aggravated robbery statute, includes the 
offense of robbery, defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999). Section 76-6-301 
provides: 
1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) (Emphasis added). 
Section 76-6-302, provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; [] 
(3) For the purposes of this party an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit 
. . . a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) provides for the inchoate offense of "attempt," as 
follows: 
1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission 
of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
11 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). 
On appeal, defendant asserts five claims of trial court error: (1) the improper denial 
of the opportunity to examine the witnesses about their immigration status and the contents 
of their wallets for the purpose of impeaching their credibility and "negating the existence 
of wallets and the claimed content" (Aplt. Br. at 15,18-21); (2) plain error in allowing a law 
enforcement officer to testify that a codefendant had stated that defendant had one of the 
victim's wallets (Aplt. Br. at 15,21 -25); (3) plain error in allowing a law enforcement officer 
to interpret the events depicted on the videotape, particularly that defendant was shown going 
through the victim's pockets looking for something to take (Aplt. Br. at 16, 25-30); (4) the 
prosecution was improperly allowed to impeach its own witness about defendant's 
possession of a wallet that he later threw from the getaway car (Aplt. Br. at 16, 30-35); and 
(5) failure to grant a new trial in light of evidence that Afii falsely testified that defendant 
had a wallet (Aplt. Br. at 17, 35-39). 
All of defendant's claims are challenges to the existence of the victims' wallets. 
Defendant's purpose in challenging the existence of the wallets is to undermine confidence 
that the prosecution failed to prove a crucial element of aggravated robbery under the first 
variant of the offense, to wit: that the defendant "unlawfully and intentionally [took] . . . 
personal property in the possession of another from his person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1), - (3) (incorporating the simple robbery statute). However, defendant has conspicuously 
12 
avoided the prosecution's repeated and primary argument to the jury, supported by statute 
and the jury instructions, that evidence of an "attempt to commit . . . a robbery" was 
sufficient to support convictions on the two counts of aggrav red robbery, even if defendant 
did not actually remove anything from the victim's pockets (R. 324:252-53, 270; Jury 
Instructions 11, 12, and 14, at R. 143-44, 146). 
Evidence of defendant's attempt to take personal property from each victim was 
overwhelming and, in part, undisputed. The videotape shows defendant involved in brutally 
beating both Jose and Gabriel and then going through their pockets (VT. 2:26:26-27:03).5 
Rachel Redding confirmed what is depicted on the videotape when she testified, without 
objection, that two or three of Jose's and Gabriel's assailants searched their pockets (R. 
324:193, 195). On appeal, defendant does not challenge the accuracy of Rachel's 
observations. Defendant's rummaging through the victims' pockets is conclusive evidence 
of his intent to take personal property from the victims. See State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295, 
295-96 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (knife slash while demanding victim's car keys constituted 
a "substantial step" in attempting to take property sufficient to prove intent to commit a 
robbery in aggravated robbery conviction); People v. Harris, 217 N.E.2d 503,506 (111. App. 
Ct. 1966) (one of assailants' going through the victim's pockets during victim's beating 
5
 Defendant does not dispute that it was defendant who bent over the victims, 
although he does dispute that Detective Lone should have been permitted to interpret 
defendant's actions as "going through [the victims'] pockets." Aplt. Br. at Pt. Ill, at 26-
27. However, by admitting that he assaulted both victims, defendant has essentially 
admitted that the videotape correctly depicts him going through the victims' pockets 
because the videotape depicts only one of the victims' three assailants both attacking the 
victims and going through their pockets (R. 324:263-64, 266, 269; VT. 2:26:26-27:03). 
13 
constituted a "substantial step" sufficient to prove attempt to commit robbery even though 
there existed no evidence of actual loss of property); People v. McAfee, 225 N.E.2d 74, 75-
76 (111. App. Ct. 1967) (evidence that defendants' going through victim's pockets while 
beating victim sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt). See also State 
v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1984) (defendant's and his accomplices' specific acts 
in preparation for uncompleted robbery constituted "substantial steps" sufficient for 
conviction for attempted robbery).6 
Thus, overwhelming evidence of defendant's intent to unlawfully attempt to take 
personal property from each of the victims, after brutally beating them unconscious, 
established defendant's guilt of two counts of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This is so even if the victims and Afu had lied and the wallets did not exist. Stated 
differently, this Court could not lose confidence in the jury's verdict, based on overwhelming 
evidence that defendant plainly attempted to rob his victims. Because the evidence so 
substantially establishes defendant's guilt on a theory clearly presented to the jury and that 
rendered the existence of the wallets superfluous, this Court should decline to even consider 
6
 Additionally, although Rachel did not see anything removed from Jose's pockets, 
she did see something come out of Gabriel's pockets, although she could not say that it 
was a wallet (R. 324:193, 195). Gabriel testified that he had a wallet containing S80 
when he went into the restaurant, but did not have the wallet or any money when he 
awoke in the hospital (R. 324:158, 163-64). Similarly, Jose entered the restaurant with a 
wallet, which he later reported stolen to Detective Lone (R. 323:119, 136). The videotape 
depicts defendant going through Jose's pockets even more clearly than it does defendant 
going through Gabriel's pockets (VT. 2:26:26-27:03). Thus, there is additional 
compelling evidence that defendant actually robbed both victims. See State v. Dumas, 
721 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1986) (more than ample evidence sustained conviction for 
aggravated robbery where the defendant brutally beat and frisked both victims, demanded 
money, and took a wallet and checkbook of one but not the other victim). 
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claims that purport to make the nonexistence of those wallets significant. In any event, a 
review of defendant's claims reveals them to be meritless. 
B. Defendant's various claims ultimately challenging the 
existence of the victims9 wallets are uniformly without merit. 
/. Defendant invited any error concerning the trial court's refusal 
to permit examination as to the victims' immigration status 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to 
examine the witnesses about their immigration status and the contents of their wallets for the 
purpose of impeaching their credibility and "negating the existence of wallets and the 
claimed content" (Aplt. Br. at 15, 18-21). Defendant invited any error. 
"The doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and 
then complaining of it on appeal."' State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting State v. Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the policy behind 
this well-established rule: 
We adhere to this rule for two important reasons. "'First, it fortifies our 
long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to 
address the claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
appeal."' [ State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)] (quoting 
DwAw,850P.2datl220). 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54,70 P.3d 111. Stee also State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 
1022-23 (Utah 1987) (declining to review a challenge to a jury instruction stipulated to by 
defense counsel at trial under invited error doctrine). 
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Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion a limine to prohibit defendant from 
inquiring into or referring at trial to the victims' immigration status (R. 86, 90-93). In her 
memorandum, the prosecutor acknowledged that both victims were residing in the United 
States illegally (R. 92). However, noting the elements of aggravated robbery, the prosecutor 
argued that their status as illegal aliens was irrelevant to the proof of any element of the 
charged offenses, and therefore inadmissible (R. 92). At the hearing on the motion, the trial 
court asked defense counsel, "Is there any objection to the State's motion with regard to 
immigration status?" (R. 322:5). Counsel responded, "No, Your Honor" (R. 322:5). The 
trial court then ruled: "By stipulation, then, it won't be mentioned" (R. 322:5). Somewhat 
later, counsel sought to clarify the court's ruling, stating that the only way in which he would 
raise the issue of the victims' immigration status was if the prosecution mentioned it, or if 
it became relevant, which counsel thought probable (R. 322:9). The trial court readily agreed 
that defendant could address the matter if the prosecution opened the door (R. 322:9). The 
court also signaled its readiness to reconsider the relevance of the matter, but at that point 
could see no relevance (R. 322:9). 
At trial, even though the prosecutor had not elicited any testimony concerning Jose's 
immigration status and without any proffer that the matter had become relevant, defense 
counsel asked Jose on cross-examination if he was presently being deported or whether he 
claimed to have an INS card (R. 323:147).7 The trial court sustained objections to both 
Detective Lone explained that a "green card" is issued by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and entitles the card holder to be in the United States and to 
work here (R. 323:119-20). 
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questions on grounds of relevance (R. 323:147). Defense counsel never requested a side-bar 
or conference with the court regarding the relevance of those questions. 
Based on defendant's express agreement to forego asking about the victims' 
immigration status and his failure to later assert that questions relating to Jose's immigration 
status were relevant, defendant invited any error stemming from the trial court's exclusion 
of the victim's immigration status and matters related to it. Invited error makes plain error 
inapplicable. Consequently, the Court should decline to consider this claim of error. 
Even if the Court were to disregard defendant's inviting error and find that the trial 
court erred, any error was harmless. First, defendant was substantially able to impeach Jose 
in the manner he intended. Defendant elicited from Detective Lone that he had interviewed 
Jose, who told him that his wallet, containing cash from his paycheck and his "green card," 
had been taken in the robbery (R. 323:119-21). Defendant later successfully challenged 
Jose's credibility when he elicited from Jose that he did not know if anyone had taken $220 
from him, that he did not recall telling anyone that his green card had been stolen, and that 
the green card was not in his wallet (R. 323:144,147-48). Defendant also elicited from Jose 
that he had been convicted of a felony weapons charge and that he had been previously 
deported (R. 323:146-47). In short, defendant succeeded in challenging Jose's credibility by 
showing that he had apparently testified differently at trial than he had reported to Detective 
Lone concerning the contents of the wallet. Defendant also at least suggested that the 
existence of the INS card was in doubt because Jose was likely still an illegal alien. 
Defendant reinforced these impressions by eliciting from Detective Lone that he never 
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located the wallet, the money, or the green card, that he did not see the wallet on the 
videotape, that he did not know for a "positive certainty" that the wallet was missing, and did 
not know if the INS card actually existed (R. 323:121-22, 127). 
More significantly, as argued at the outset, is that defendant's casting doubt on the 
existence or nonexistence of the victims' wallets and their contents or the victims' credibility 
concerning those items could not have resulted in a different outcome at trial. 
2. Defendant affirmatively waived his challenge to Detective Lone's testimony; 
the record provides no foundation for a denial-of confrontation challenge 
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error in allowing Detective Lone to 
testify that Afii told him that defendant had one of the victim's wallets. Defendant claims 
allowing this testimony violated Bruton v. United States. Aplt. Br. at 15,21-25.8 The Court 
should decline to consider this claim because defendant's failure to object to the challenged 
testimony was evidently deliberate trial strategy, Bruton plainly does not apply to this case, 
and any error is harmless. 
In State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990), the 
defendant alleged violations of due process and ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 157. 
Because defense counsel in Bullock failed to object, the defendant's claims were amenable 
8
 "In order to obtain appellate relief through the doctrine of 'plain error,' an 
appellant must establish that \i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 
1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208). 
"[T]he error must be 'plain,' which means that 'from our examination of the record, we 
must be able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing 
error.'" State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989). 
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to review only under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 158. As a threshold matter, the Utah 
Supreme Court refused to consider the merits of the plain error claim because counsel's 
failure to object was a reasonable strategic decision, rather than an oversight: "If the decision 
was conscious and did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should 
refuse to consider the merits of the trial court's ruling." Id. at 158-59. 
In this case, defense counsel's not objecting to Detective Lone's testimony about 
Afu's previous disclosures about the wallet was almost certainly a reasonable and 
consciously deliberate decision. Counsel obviously knew that Detective Lone had 
interviewed Afu. Counsel requested a copy of the interview in discovery; and it is evident 
from his cross-examination of Afu that he was familiar with the statements Afu had made 
during the interview (R. 13-15; 324:217-20). From the prosecution's witness list, counsel 
knew that Afu would be called to testify, and counsel would have reasonably anticipated that 
Afu's trial testimony would be consistent with the statements he made during the interview 
with Detective Lone (R. 64). In short, because counsel's not objecting to Detective Lone's 
report of his interview with Afu was almost certainly deliberate and reasonable, the Court 
should decline to consider defendant's claim under the plain error doctrine. 
In any case, defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution were not 
violated because no Bruton issue exists in this case. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968), the defendant and his codefendant were convicted of armed 
robbery at a joint trial based on the codefendant's confession that both he and Bruton 
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committed the offense. Id. at 124, 88 S. Ct. at 1621-22. The court held that the introduction 
of such a confession where the codefendant-confessor did not take the stand denied Bruton 
his right to confront a witness against him. Id. at 137, 88 S. Ct. at 1628. See State v. Webb, 
779 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1989) ("[I]f the declarant is not present, the core values of the 
confrontation right are implicated because '[t]he essence of the confrontation right is the 
opportunity to have the accusing witness in court and subject to cross-examination, so that 
bias and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of fact.'") (quoting State v. Nelson, 725 
P.2dl353, 1356(1986)). 
None of the constraints on confrontation which the Supreme Court found 
objectionable in Bruton are present in this case. "When an out-of-court statement is offered 
at trial for the truth of the matter asserted and the declarant is present and available for cross-
examination, no federal or state confrontation problem is presented." State v. Loughton, 747 
P.2d 426, 429 (Utah 1987). Afii was not tried jointly with defendant. Rather, Afii pleaded 
guilty to aggravated assault before trial (R. 263, 324:206); therefore, there was no Fifth 
Amendment limitation on the extent to which defendant could examine Afu. See State v. 
Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 223 (Utah 1995) (recognizing that following the entry of an 
accomplice's guilty plea and his sentencing, there existed "[no] real and demonstrable fear 
of future prosecution for the same offense") (citing Affleck v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 655 
P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1982)). Afu was available to testify, defendant vigorously cross-
examined him at trial, and he even called Afu to testify on his own behalf (R. 202-221). 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion, and as discussed fully in the final section of this 
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brief, Afu never admitted that he lied about defendant's possession of a wallet, but rather 
consistently reported throughout the proceedings that he lied only about his relationship with 
defendant (R. 227-32, 323:125-126, 132-33; 324:202, 204-07, 218). In sum, defendant's 
claim has no foundation in the record 
Even if there were some conceivable error, it was harmless. First, although Detective 
Lone testified before Afu, the former's testimony was merely cumulative of Afii's testimony 
that defendant had one of the victim's wallets when he left the restaurant and then threw it 
from the getaway car. Second, as argued above, the existence of the wallets was immaterial 
to defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery. 
3. Defendant invited any error in Detective Lone's 
commentary about what the videotape depicted 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error in allowing Detective Lone 
to interpret the events depicted on the videotape, particularly that defendant was shown going 
through the victim's pockets looking for something to take. Aplt. Br. at 16, 25-30. Again, 
because defendant invited any error by actively soliciting the same type of commentary by 
the detective and other witnesses, this Court should decline to consider defendant's claim. 
In State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,63 P.3d 110, a companion case to this one, the 
defendant also argued that the trial court committed plain error in admitting the same 
videotape used in this case without a proper foundation. Id. at ffl[ 19-29. Rejecting the claim, 
this Court noted that even if there was error, defendant invited it, and the Court would 
therefore decline to review the merits of the claim under the plain error doctrine. Id. at <ffl 
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24, 29. In support, the Court recited numerous instances during the trial in which the 
defendant used the videotape to advance the theory of the defense. Id at fflf 25-29 
As in Bloomfield, defense counsel in this case acquiesced in the prosecutor's use of 
the videotape from the outset, and thereafter repeatedly used the videotape to develop the 
theory of the defense. A nonexhaustive recitation of counsel's acquiescence in the use of the 
videotape and his subsequent reliance on it during the examination of Deputy Huggard 
consists of the following: (1) counsel did not object when Deputy Huggard testified, without 
challenge, that State's exhibit 3 was a true and accurate copy of the videotape made by the 
surveillance camera at Beto's on the night of the incident (R. 323:73-75); (2) on cross-
examination, counsel asked the deputy, "As you looked at the videotape, would it be fair to 
say that Mr. Langi walked along here, on the north side of those windows?" (R. 323.95); (3) 
counsel asked, "Didn't you observe the video and observe Jose and Rachel approach the 
counter?" (R. 323:97); (4) when the deputy stated that one of defendant's companions 
standing at the counter assaulted Jose, counsel asked, "And are you sure that the video 
shows that?" (R. 323.98); (5) counsel further asked, "During the course of during [sic] the 
video, can you hear any conversation between Jose and any of the Polynesian men 
[codefendants] at the counter?" (R. 323:98); and (6) when the prosecutor elicited from the 
deputy on redirect examination that his primary sources of information in the investigation 
were eyewitness interviews and "the videotape," counsel did not object (R. 323 102). In 
closing, after directing the jury to examine the videotape, defendant relied on information 
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about the positioning and actions of the parties in the restaurant to suggest that Jose, rather 
than defendant and his companions initiated the entire incident with a stare (R. 324:264-68) 
Defense counsel also acquiesced in the use of the videotape and then later relied on 
it for defense purposes during the examination of Detective Lone. Defense counsel never 
objected when Detective Lone completed the foundation for the videotape, State's exhibit 
3, or when the videotape was admitted into evidence (R. 323:104-06). Except as to the 
detective's observation that defendant went through Jose's pockets, defense counsel barely 
objected to any of the detective's extensive observations about what the videotape depicted 
(R. 323:109-18). Thereafter, on cross-examination, defense counsel relied heavily on 
Detective Lone's observations about what the videotape depicted: (1) counsel asked the 
detective, "At any time during the course of viewing that video, did you see any wallet?" (R. 
323:121-22); (2) counsel followed by asking if the detective saw whether it was Rachel or 
Jose who paid for their meals (R. 323:122); (3) counsel asked a series of questions, explicitly 
challenging how the detective had "interpreted]" the videotape, to attack the detective's 
uncertainty about whether Afu had shaken hands with Jose or Gabriel (R. 323:122-23); (4) 
counsel continued to invite the detective to refer to videotape to identify the participants' 
locations in the restaurant (R. 323:123-35; (5) counsel asked Detective Lone to interpret from 
the demeanor of one of the restaurant patrons that "something [was] happening" (R. 
323 130); (6) directing Detective Lone to his observation of the videotape, counsel asked if 
the detective could see "any wallets" in defendant's hands, to which the detective was unable 
to give an affirmative answer (R. 323:131); and (7) when an objection was sustained to 
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counsel's question, "As you saw the video, the timing in question, could Mr. Afii, at Beto's, 
have seen Mr. Langi go through the pockets of Jose or Gabriel," counsel responded, "The 
video speaks for itself (R. 323:134). 
The clear purpose of the foregoing examination was to challenge the detective's 
unfavorable videotape observations, confirm that the videotape did not clearly show 
defendant taking the victims' wallets, infer that because Rachel paid for Jose's meal he had 
no money or a wallet, and suggest that the attack was the result of events initiated by the 
victims prior to defendants' entry into the restaurant. In sum, because defendant so actively 
invited the error claimed on appeal, this Court, as in Bloomfield, should decline to consider 
the merits of defendant's claim. 
In any event, as argued at the outset of this brief, any error is harmless. 
4. Impeachment testimony ofAfu was properly admitted substantively 
Defendant claims the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to impeach Afii's 
testimony that, upon leaving the restaurant, defendant had a wallet that he later threw from 
the getaway car. Aplt. Br. at 16,30-35. Defendant's claim, that impeachment evidence 
comes in only to challenge the witness's credibility and not substantively, is without merit. 
Moreover, any error is harmless. 
The prosecutor called Afu to testify (R. 324:202). After the prosecutor established 
that defendant and his companions left the restaurant in Afii's car, the following exchange 
took place: 
PROSECUTOR (Ms. Wissler): Do you recall whether the defendant had anything 
with him when he got into your car? 
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WITNESS (Afii): You know what, I really don't remember. 
Q: You don't remember if he had anything in his hand? 
A: No. I don't remember - - no, I don't. 
Q: Do you recall being interviewed by Detective Lone about this case shortly 
after it occurred? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you recall telling Detective Lone that when the defendant got into your 
car- -
DEFENSE COUNSEL (Mr. Gotay): Objection, your Honor, she is impeaching 
her own witness. 
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, the rules of evidence specifically allow me to 
impeach my own witness. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
Q (By Ms. Wissler): Do you recall telling the detective when the defendant 
got into your car he had a wallet with him? 
A: No, I don't recall, but if that's what I told him, then . . . . 
Ms. Wissler: May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q: Are you aware of the interview you had with Detective Lone was audio 
recorded? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Handing you page 2 of the transcript of that interview, and directing 
your attention to about the top four questions and answers, does 
that refresh your recollection of what you told Detective Lone when 
you were interviewed? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: What was it that you told Detective Lone when you were interviewed? 
A: Do you want me to read this? 
Q: I just want - -1 want to ask you if that refreshes your memory about what 
you told Detective Lone. 
A: Yes, this is what I told him, I guess. It was too long ago. I don't really 
remember what I said. But, yeah, this is what I said. If it was on tape, 
this is everything I said. 
Q: That transcript accurately reflects the interview you had with Detective 
Lone? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you not tell Detective Lone it was the defendant that had a wallet 
in his hand when he got into your car? 
A. Yes. 
Q: Did you also tell Detective Lone that the defendant threw that wallet out 
of the car at some point? 
A. Yes, I did. 
(R. 324:204-06). 
Defendant argues that the foregoing exchange, establishing that Afu did indeed recall 
telling Detective Lone during their interview that defendant had a wallet upon leaving the 
restaurant which he later threw from the getaway car, was improperly admitted. Specifically, 
defendant asserts that "[i]t has long been a matter of well settled law in Utah that 
impeachment is not evidence." Aplt. Br. at 32. In support defendant cites two ninety-year-
old Utah cases and two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal cases that predate the adoption of the 
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governing rules of evidence, all for the purpose of asserting that impeachment evidence may 
not be admitted substantively. Defendant misstates the current rule of law. 
The rule applicable to the impeachment set out above is rule 801 (d)( 1)(A), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. The rule provides: 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement 
is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having 
made the statement or has forgotten[.] 
Utah R. Evid. 801 (d)(1)(A). The Utah rule is adopted from the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
However, "[i]t deviates from the federal rule in that it allows the use of prior statements as 
substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and does not require 
the prior statement to have been given under oath or subject to perjury." Utah R. Evid. 801 
advisory committee note.9 See State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 483-84 (Utah App. 1989) 
(evidence admitted under rule 801(d)(1)(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, as a prior inconsistent 
statement, is admissible as substantive evidence). Plainly, the trial court correctly permitted 
Afu's testimony without a limiting instruction directing the jury to consider it only for 
impeachment. Moreover, any error, as argued at the outset, was harmless. 
9
 In fact, following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1983 and in 
accord with the prevailing view, federal courts within the Tenth Circuit have held that 
impeachment evidence through prior inconsistent statements is admissible substantively. 
See United States v. Wittgenstein, 163 F.3d 1164, 1172 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Bahe, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1309 (D. N.M. 1998). 
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5. Defendant's challenge to the denial of his new trial motion 
lacks any record support and fails to marshal evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and conclusions 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial. 
Aplt. Br. at 35-39. He first argues in support of his motion that Afu admitted that he lied to 
Detective Lone during his interview about defendant's handling and disposing of a wallet. 
Aplt. Br. at 36. Defendant then argues that the prosecutor conceded at the hearing on the 
motion that Afu had lied to the detective that defendant had the wallet. Aplt. Br. at 37. 
Defendant then denounces the prosecution for opposing his new trial motion knowing that 
Afu lied to the detective about the wallet, all of which he claims exacerbates the trial court's 
error in having improperly admitted Afli's impeachment testimony (Aplt. Pt. IV) and 
Detective Lone's testimony in violation of Bruton (Aplt. Pt. II). Aplt. Br. at 37-39. 
Defendant's argument misrepresents both Afli's and the prosecutor's remarks regarding the 
wallet and totally fails to address the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
denying the new trial motion. 
Afu admitted that he lied to Detective Lone about his relationship to defendant, and 
the prosecutor admitted at the hearing on defendant's motion that Afu had lied about "certain 
things" during the interview (R. 210,226,326:9). However, contrary to defendant's claims, 
Afu never admitted lying about the crucial fact claimed on appeal, that defendant handled 
a wallet after the robbery, nor did the prosecutor ever concede that Afu had lied about that 
fact. By substituting the true reference concerning Afli's lie to the detective, defendant has 
substantially misconstrued the fair import of the record. 
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In support of defendant's new trial motion, Afii signed an affidavit that he did not see 
defendant take or steal anything (R. 199). That statement is irrelevant to whether Afii 
subsequently saw defendant handle a wallet. It is also a red herring because the prosecutor 
readily conceded at trial that Afu would not have seen defendant take any wallet since he had 
already exited the restaurant at the point defendant went through the victims' pockets (R. 
324:234, 251; VT:2:26:24-27:03). 
After defendant filed his motion for a new trial, Sergeant Kevin Judd interviewed Afii 
to determine whether he had lied in his pretrial interview with Detective Lone or at trial (R. 
210, 218-33).l0 Afu admitted that he had lied to Detective Lone about his relationship with 
defendant (R. 226-27). However, Afii asserted to Sergeant Judd that he never lied to 
Detective Lone or while on the stand, that defendant "had the wallets and threw [them] out." 
Afii only admitted to lying when, to protect defendant's identity, he told the detective that 
he let defendant out at the church when defendant had actually slept at Afli's house that night 
(R. 227-29, 232). As to this point, Sergeant Judd and Afu had the following exchange: 
KJ: So in all reality you did not lie about anything to the investigator 
[Detective Lone] about the crime itself? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Or to . . . the State when you were witness on the stand is that correct? 
SA: Oh I did not lie on the stand at all. The only time I lied was when I first 
got caught and was talking to investigators. 
KJ: And you more or less minimized your relationship with Joe? 
10
 A copy of the interview, attached to the prosecution's motion in opposition to 
defendant's new trial motion, is attached at Addendum B. 
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SA: Yeah. 
KJ: You didn't tell them the whole .. . 
SA: Story about Joe. 
KJ: Story about how well you knew Joe? 
SA: No. 
KJ: But you did seen him throw that wallet out the window by the Methodist Church? 
SA: I seen, I seen him with money I can't, I don't even remember what I said 
back then about the . . . 
KJ: I, I understand it has been quite a while. 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: I will refer back to page 24 of the interview with Detective Lone. He 
asked, I will just mention a few statements on this interview. He says, 
"Who had the wallets." This is Jeff Lone talking he said, "Who had the 
wallets and threw [sic] out?" Do you remember where and then you 
repeat, you answer, "Joe that Joe dude,["] and you're referring to Joe 
Langi, right?" 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And he says, "Cause they these guys you know they had their green 
cards in them, all their personal papers and stuff." That's Jeff 
Lone then your answer is, "Uh yeah, he throw [sic] out right on 
the street right when we were driving right on 54, you know what 
I mean cause we never went." And then there is some inaudible 
conversations and then uh, he asks, Jeff Lone asks you, "Let him 
out at the church." 
SA: That was a lie. 
KJ: Was that a lie? 
SA: Yeah. 
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KJ: So there was little bits and pieces of where you lied to the . .. 
SA: Yeah cause see I never let him out at the church. I took; he slept 
over at my house that night. 
(R. 227-28). Thereafter, Afu reiterated that although he had not told Detective Lone the 
whole truth about his relationship to defendant, he did not lie about the crime itself (R. 230, 
232). More particularly, at the conclusion of the interview Sergeant Judd asked if Afu had 
lied about anything other than his relationship with defendant and his letting defendant out 
near the church (R. 232). Afu answered, "No" (R. 232). 
The fair reading of Afu's interview with Sergeant Judd is that Afu initially lied to 
Detective Lone about his relationship with defendant to both distance himself from the crime 
and to protect defendant, whom he knew well (R. 225-26). However, Afu adamantly 
asserted that he never lied, either in his interview with Detective Lone or at trial, about the 
details of the crime, including defendant's holding a wallet when he entered the getaway car. 
Consequently, defendant failed to establish a factual basis to support his motion for a new 
trial. 
This Court should also decline to even consider the merits of defendant's challenge 
to the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial because defendant does not challenge 
the trial court's factual findings or legal conclusions. 
In denying defendant's motion, the court made detailed findings of fact (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Defendant's New Trial Motion, R. 262-71, attached at 
Addendum C). Among those findings are the following: (1) Afu admitted lying at trial about 
his relationship with defendant (R. 264 at ^ 10); (2) Afii testified that when defendant got 
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into the car he appeared to be holding a wallet and money with blood on it (R. 264 at f 14); 
(3) in signing the affidavit in support of the new trial motion, Afu believed he was only 
admitting that he had not been truthful to Detective Lone about his relationship with 
defendant (R. 267 at f 28); (4) Afu stated that he did not lie about anything else concerning 
the events at the restaurant (R. 267 at f 29); and (5) Afu denied that he was ever coached or 
pressured by the prosecutor about how to answer any question put to him at trial and that he 
had otherwise testified truthfully at trial (R. 267 at f 31-31). Defendant has failed to 
challenge any of the foregoing findings of fact. 
Defendant has also failed to challenge any of the court's conclusions of law denying 
his motion for a new trial. "4[I]f a trial court has applied the correct legal standard, it has 
broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 
30, f 27,25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, % 5,984 P.2d 975)). "'The legal 
standard to be applied when considering a motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered 
evidence is that the moving party must show that the evidence satisfies the following factors: 
(i) it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial; (ii) 
it is not merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result probable on retrial.'" Id. 
(quoting Martin, at f 5). 
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court concluded that "the revelation . . . of 
George Afu that he lied to investigators does not constitute newly discovered evidence," 
because "[a]ll of matters about which Afu admitted lying were matters know[n] to the 
defendant at the time of trial" (R. 268 at f^ 1). The court noted that defendant's allegation, 
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that Afii had perjured himself at trial, was unsupported because Afu did not admit, either in 
the affidavit or in his interview with Sergeant Judd that he had lied at trial (R. 268, at ffll 2 
and 6). The court concluded that because defense counsel had ample time to interview Afu 
prior to trial, counsel could have discovered, with due diligence, any of Afu's prospective 
trial testimony (R. 269 atf 4). Finally, the court concluded that "the evidence of defendant's 
guilt in this case was overwhelming" (R. 269 at f 8). The court stated: 
The videotape admitted into evidence, which captured the offenses in progress, 
provided sufficient evidence to convict defendant. That video, particularly 
when coupled with the testimony of Jose Farias, Gabriel Calvillo, Rachel 
Redding, and George Afu, was so compelling that it makes the likelihood of 
a different result extremely remote. That is, even if this Court were to 
determine that some newly discovered evidence existed which could not have 
been discovered with due diligence prior to trial, that new evidence would not 
make a different result probable at a new trial. 
(R. 269-70 at f 8). 
Because defendant has not challenged either the trial court's well-founded findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, this Court should decline to consider his challenge to the 
court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Cf. State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 930 (Utah 
App. 1994) (ruling that because "[djefendant has failed to properly marshal the evidence in 
favor of the trial court's findings . . . [w]e therefore accept the findings as entered"). 
In any event, as argued at the outset of this brief, any error was harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
cA 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Qp day of October, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Assistant Attorney General 
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[Rights of accused.] 
In all cnminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which distnct shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
( D A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(DA person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he* 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601, 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
»c) takes an operable motor vehicle 
'2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be 'in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after thp attamm- ^ ~~. 
LT\H RILES OF EWDENCE 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article 
(a) Statement A 'statement* is (1) an oral or written assertion or 2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement 
< c) Hearsay. ^Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if 
(d)(1) Prior statement by witness The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the 
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness 
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or < B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabncation or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person, or 
(d)(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered against a 
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested 
an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by 
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or <D) a statement by 
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency 
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, oi (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party dunng the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION UNIT 
INTERVIEWEE: SIAOSI AFU (George) 
SUBJECT: JOSEPH MAKA LANGI 
DATE: JULY 18, 2001 
CASE No: 2001-893 
RE: PERJURY 
Okay today's date is July 18th year 2001. Time right now is 10:30 hours. This is 
a meeting with Defense Attorney David Biggs and his client Siaosi, spelling, S-I-A-OS-
L 
KJ: You go by the name of George? 
SA: George Yeah. 
KJ: Afu, A-F-U. This meeting is being held at the District Attorney's office, 231 east 
400 south, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DB: Before we begin I wanted maybe to uh, well short circuit this a little bit. I told my 
client that he is under investigation for perjury since that is what Sirena Wissler 
indicated to me. Just as a general statement, "Before we begin, George wants you 
to know that the following are the facts in this case, having to do with the Perjury 
allegation. Number one; George doesn't read. George never read this document 
that he signed. That's number one. Number two; it was never read to him 
Verbatim by anyone. It was basically, distracted for him by his wife and then he 
signed it but he never read it, cant read and didn't read it. Um, Number three; he 
never lied under oath. Number four: he did lie to the investigating officer initially 
that only having to do with his participation. And that's what his wife told him 
this thing said, that his wife said that two things this document said, one, that he 
initially lied to the investigating officer which is accurate. But then he told the 
truth. Second she said that this document said that he never saw his two co-
defendants actually take anything from the two victims. And that is true, he 
didn't see that he was out getting the car in the car leaving but he did tell the 
investigator that the gentleman in the back seat and I apologize I don't know 
which co-defendant that is, showed him some bloody money and said do you 
want some of this. And he said no. And so the document is incorrect when he 
says that he, or infers that he lied on the stand, he did not do that. It's incorrect or 
inaccurate when it indicates that he lied to the investigating officer concerning his 
sore testimony. He didn't do that either. And lastly he wants everyone to know 
that Sirena Wissler did not coach him, and did not push him and did not threaten 
him to testify in any particular way, that just did not happened. And he 
apologizes to Mrs. Wissler and to the prosecution if he could read, he would have 
read it if he... 
Yeah I would have never signed anything like that saying that I lied under oath 
cause I didn't lie under oath. 
And that's what the impression was when I read it. After reading the motion, the 
motion does not, this memorandum does not even really compare to the statement 
on this paper for one thing and I wanted to go through a series of questions and 
talk to you about those. 
Okay. 
And how they relate okay? 
Okay. 
And I talked to Deputy District attorney Sirena Wissler about picking this apart 
because in my opinion, it is not accurate of what you even signed okay? 
Okay. 
What he is suggesting to the court you did okay. 
Okay. 
And she didn't have a chance to really thoroughly read this, but I believe its all 
gonna come, the truth is gonna come out in our little interview here today. 
Okay. 
Okay. And I that is what I want to stress, I want to stress truthfulness here. 
Okay. 
And that will all come to light okay? 
Okay. 
Because Mr. Gotay is accusing you of perjury okay? 
Okay. 
KJ: Doesn't necessanly mean that we are accusing you of that okay9 But that is what 
he is accusing you of okay9 But because he is accusing you of that, I have to 
investigate because you were a witness for the state, Okay. 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: Does that make sense? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay. But since you are being accused of that, I need to read your Miranda 
warnings okay? Even thought you are being represented by your attorney here 
okay you have legal counsel here I'm still going to read you Miranda warnings 
okay? 
SA: Okay 
KJ: And that, that we just want the truth okay? 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: And at any time you don't need to answer or Mr. Biggs can step in and tell me so, 
okay? 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: All right listen carefully. You have the right to remam silent anything you say 
can and will be used against you in court. You have the right to consult to a 
lawyer before answering any questions and to have a lawyer with you during any 
questiomng. If you can't afford a lawyer one will be provided for you free of cost 
as you, if you want one, as you well know. Do you understand your rights as I 
have explained them? 
SA: Yes. 
KJ: Okay. And you are here with legal counsel right now and you are willing to talk 
with me about this? 
SA: Yes sir. 
KJ: Okay. And I appreciate your summary of Mr. Afii's statement from the very start 
Mr. Biggs. I believe we are all on about the same page here. But we want to get 
it down because she has to prepare a response to his memorandum, as you well 
know Okay now let me start with the very first the letter that you have in front of 
you is marked exhibit one and it's um, I'm gonna read it for the record. It says it 
has a date at the top it says May 21, 2001. To whom it may concern; and then it 
says, re, reference Joseph M Langi statement of Siaosi Afu It says, "My name is 
Siaosi Afti I am Joe's co-defender in this case I am giving this statement on 
behalf of Joe Langi I am sorry to say that I have lied on the investigators report 
because it was a part of our deal to testify against Joe And because of the 
prosecutor's pushing and coaching questions, I have to lie I did not see Joe took 
or steal anything from the two victims, because I have left the scene to pick up the 
vehicle. It was the investigator that asked me and told me about the stolen items, 
and also told me that if I tell them what they wanted to know, they would give me 
a lighter sentences and dismiss my other cases. I testified that the above 
statement is true and correct statement made by me on this 22 day of May 
Sincerely Siaosi Afu. And then there is a signature in cursive it looks like it's 
George Afu and then there is another signature in cursive says Shanna Darnels 
With the date 5/23/01 and written and then there is Shanna Daniel notary republic 
stamp on the bottom of the letter As Mr. Biggs has already stated, you cannot 
read, is that correct9 
SA: I can read a little bit but I can't read big words. 
KJ: Do you remember seeing this letter in front of you7 
SA: Yeah 
KJ: Was it notarized in front of you? 
SA: Yes. 
KJ: Okay Urn, who prepared the letter? Who actually typed this out? 
SA: I don't even know 
KJ: Who's idea was this letter? 
SA: It was brought to me by my friend his name is Sam. 








And when your friend Sam brought this to you, 
Yes. 
At your house? 
Yeah. 
Why did he say he was bringing it to you? 
To sign it. 
Okay what for, to help Joseph? 
To help Joe yeah. 
To help Joe get out of the bad sentencing he had gotten right? 
Yeah. I think he's, yeah. 
Cause he was convicted in trial? 
Yeah. Well we didn't really talk about he just brought it and told me, "Hey this 
the thing to help out Joe. 
Okay. 
Anduh... 
You want to help out Joe and he's a friend? 
Yeah. 
And you don't have no hard feelings towards him or anything like that? You did 
not understand the letter and what it really said at the time that you signed it? 
No, no I didn't, I thought that the letter meant that I lied to the detectives when I 
got interviewed and that was what my wife told me. 
So when Sam Misini brought it over, he said this is to help Joe? 
No. 
KJ: And you kind of looked it over but you didn't really understand it? 
SA: Well I took it, well my wife; I gave it to my wife. 
KJ: And did your wife read it to you? 
SA: Yeah she read it and then she told me that and I asked her if there was anything 
that would get me into trouble and she said she didn't think so but she didn't 
know for sure though. 
KJ: Did Sam say that it was from Mr. Gotay? That Mr. Gotay... 
SA: No I don't even think he knew where it came he came from L.A. 
KJ: Okay so Sam didn't tell you that Joe's attorney that he had got it from Joe's 
attorney? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay. And at the time that Sam showed this to you, Mr. Biggs was not notified, 
you did not call Mr. Biggs? 
SA: Oh no. 
KJ: And ask him about it or anything right? 
SA: No. 
KJ: And Sam didn't tell you that you had the right to talk to your attorney before... 
SA: No. 
KJ: You looked it over and signed it did he? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay. So nobody told you that you had the right to legal representation before 
signing the letter such as this? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Are you aware that you do? 
SA: Yeah, I had known when he called me and told me that. 
KJ: Yeah the best thing you could have done at that point was to call Mr Biggs when 
Sam showed up with this letter and read it to him even over the phone 
SA: Okay 
DB: That would have been the best thing to do Just to clanfy George, Your wife read 
it, but she didn't read it to you she just read it and said this is what it says, 
correct9 
SA: Yeah. 
DB: She didn't read it what is called verbatim she didn't read it to you she just read it 
and said this is what it say's right? 
SA: Yeah that is right. 
KJ: So she didn't read it out loud to you9 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay 
SA: I just asked her to read it and then I took off and then I came back and she told me 
what was going on with it. 












Is this the address where you went at 3570 south 2700 west? 
Uhyeah. 
In West Valley? 
Right next to uh, West Valley Police. 
West Valley Police? 
Yeah. 
Okay and you went with Sam to get the stamp put on it? 
: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay let me talk to you about, a little bit about um, what Mr. Biggs has said, you 
told the investigator and also you know what I know from reading the interview 
with the investigator and what I also know as what you testified to on the stand 
okay? 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: Um, I couldn't see anywhere on the investigators interview with you that you lied 
about anything to be honest with you? 
SA: Uh-huh. 
KJ: Okay. You mentioned that you did lie to the investigator but I couldn't see where 
you did okay so if you can try to explain to me where do you think you lied to the 
investigator? 
SA: Well I got, see the thing was, when we first got caught... 
KJ: Uh-huh. 
SA: I never thought Joe would get caught so when we interviewed with the 
investigator, I told the investigator I put everything on Joe. 
KJ: Uh-huh. 
SA: So when there was, you know when he asked about wallets I was like, "Yeah he 
took them and... 
KJ: Uh-huh. 
SA: And he asked me where I, where he threw them and I told him see the whole 
statement about Joe was all incorrect cause I knew Joe. I told him, the 
investigator that I had dropped Joe off across the street from some church and I 
never did that. There was a lot of things that had to do with Joe that I didn't tell 
the investigator cause I never thought that they would catch Joe and when they 
did catch Joe, they found out then that I was, that Joe knew, that Joe knew me the 
whole time that they thought that this was going on they, when they caught Joe 
they thought that Joe knew (Inaudible) the other defendant. 
KJ: Right. 
SA: But the whole time Joe was, Joe knew me that's how Joe got, ended up with us. 
KJ: So you lied about your relationship to Joe? 
SA: Yeah 
KJ: But you didn't, you didn't, that had nothing to do with the crime itself as far as 
SA: No. 
KJ: Who did what in the crime? 
SA: Oh no, no, no. 
KJ: And as far as a wallet goes, you were telling the truth when you uh, told the 
investigator and testified on the stand that you never saw who took the wallets7 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: But you in the interview, you test, you told the investigator you saw Joseph pitch 




Do you remember telling them that? 
Yeah. 
KJ: You testified truthfully and you told the investigator truthfully that you did not 
see who took the wallet at the time of the assault cause you'd already walked 
outside to get a car? 
SA: Yeah, yeah. 
KJ: Okay. So the only lying you did to the detective was just your relationship with 
Joe7 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: How well you knew Joe? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: But not about the crime itself7 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Also dunng the interview with the detectives um, they never offered you any kind 
of deal is that correct? 
SA: No they didn't 
KJ: Yeah. So they never offered you a deal that if you testified against Joe Langi 
down the road or that you're going to get a better deal out of this, is that correct9 
SA: That's correct. 
DB: May I also add that in our discussions together that there was never any indication 
of that? Uh, at all that it would affect his sentencing what so ever. 
SA: That's correct. 
DB: But I did indicate that it certainly might if uh, if he were honest and forthright 
That always is a helpful thing for a person to do when the Adult Probation and 
Parole presentence is prepared. If the presentence people believe that ycu are 
now being honest and truthful with them and you participation in the cnme their 
much more willing to work with you as a probation. 
KJ: So in all reality you did not lie about anything to the investigator about the cnme 
itself? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Or to or to the state when you were witness on the stand is that correct? 
SA: Oh I did not he on the stand at all. The only time I lied was when I first got 









And you more or less minimized your relationship with Joe9 
Yeah. 
You didn't tell them the whole... 
Story about Joe. 
Story about how well you knew Joe9 
No. 
But you did see him throw that wallet out the window by the Methodist church9 
I seen, I seen him with money I can't, I don't even remember what I said back 
then about the... 
10 
KJ: I, I understand it has been quite awhile. 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: 1 will refer back to page 24 of the interview with Detective Jeff Lone. He asked, I 
will just mention a few statements on this interview. He says's, "Who had the 
wallets/' This is Jeff Lone talking he said, "Who had the wallets and threw out?" 
Do you remember where and then you repeat, you answer, "Joe that Joe dude and 
you're referring to Joe Langi nght? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And he says, "Cause they these guys you know they had their green cards in 
them, all their personal papers and stuff." That's Jeff Lone then your answer is, 
"Uh yeah, he threw out right on the street nght when we were driving nght on 54, 
you know what I mean cause we never went." And then there is some inaudible 
conversation and then uh, he asks, Jeff Lone asks you, "Let him out at the church" 
SA: That was a lie. 
KJ: Was that a lie? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: So there was little bits and pieces of where you lied to the... 
SA: Yeah cause see I never let him out at the church. I took; he slept over at my house 
that mght. 
KJ: So that is what you're referring to? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Is little bits and pieces about where you let Joe out because you were friends with 
Joe? 
SA: Yeah. 





Okay So he slept at your house that night9 
Yeah 
Any, can you think of any questions asked by you on the witness stand by either 
urn, the prosecutor Sirena Wissler or the defense attorney Mr Gotay, that you 
were untruthful about9 Was there anything on there that you might have lied 
about during the tnal of Joseph Langi9 
You know what to tell you the truth, I don't I don't think I did. 
Uh-huh. 
But you know I have been to tnal so many times you know and they ask, you 
know they I don't know, I have never been in courtrooms before and the way they 
ask their questions is sometimes you know they spin them around and one person 
will ask one thing and I don't, I just don't understand what they ask and that's just 
the plain, you know that's just the truth of it. Of sometimes I will say "yes" and 
they'll say, "But you stated this day before, this day that you did." And I would 
be like, "Well I guess then that's what I did then." But I don't, I don't, ]'ve been 
in court so many times that I don't even know you know what's truth and what's 
not truth any more. 
I know that some of those questions can get extremely confusing. 
Yeah. 
Um, but, George what I am asking is, um, as far as you being truthful? 
Uh-huh. 
Um, when it came to any fact about the cnme itself? 
Uh-huh. 
In your mind, you are not distorting the facts or trying to change what actually 
happened? 
Yeah. 
Were you trying to be totally truthful at all times? 
Oh yeah. 
Even when during confusing questions? 
SA: Oh yeah, oh yeah. 
KJ: Um, at that point, there was no reason to he about anything right9 
SA: No. 
KJ: Uh, initially 
SA: Once they caught Joe, there was no reason to he about anything. 
KJ: Right so you never intentionally lied on the stand? 
SA: No I never lied on the stand. 
KJ: You were extremely truthful at all times? 
SA: Yes I was. 
KJ: Okay. That, that's the whole point of this interview today. 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: Is because uh, in the memorandum sent to the sent to our office, requesting a 
motion for a new trial, your being accused of lying on the stand. 
SA: No I never .. 
KJ: And at no time did you lie on the stand? 
SA: No way. 
KJ: You did not give the whole truth to the investigator about your relationship with 
Joe? 
SA: Yes. 
KJ: But you did not lie even about the crime that occurred? 
SA: No. 
KJ: You told the truth about the crime from the start, from the time you went into 
Beto's... 
SA: Yes I did. 
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KJ: And confronted the two individuals um or, you just confronted the one individual 
basically um, initially because of the, their staring problem9 
SA: Uh-huh. 
KJ: .And fear of a gun and things like that. And that all came out m trial okay9 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And, and we want, we wanted the truth from the start and, and you gave the truth, 
is that correct? 
SA: Yes sir. 
KJ: Okay um, because your probably gonna have to be called upon to testify if their is 
a motion for a new trial with the judge and that's gonna be what your gonna be 
asked to testify to is your truthfulness. 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: Okay. Um, 
DB: George, Sirena Wissler never asked you to lie did she? 
SA: No she didn't. 
KJ: And Kevin Judd never asked you to lie, did he? 
SA: I don't know who Kevin Judd is? 
KJ: I'm Kevin Judd. I never asked you to lie, is that correct? 
SA: No, no. 
KJ: Detective Jeff Lone never asked you to lie is that correct? 
SA: No he didn't. 
KJ: Okay. Mr. Biggs touched on a point about this letter also. Um, it refers to the 
prosecutors pushing and coaching questions did Sirena Wissler or Mark Kouns 
the previous prosecutor, did they ever push you or coach you into saying a certain 
statement about what happened? 
SA: No. 
KJ: They did not? 
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SA: No they didn't. 
KJ: Okay you remember Mark Kouns he was the previous prosecutor9 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay cause that is, that is one of the statements that is on this letter that you 
signed and that's, that's an important. . 
DB: I can also state for the record that was always present with Mr Kouns or Mrs. 
Wissler when they spoke to George and I never witnessed anything of that nature 
(Inaudible) 
KJ: Very good. Can you think of anything Mr Biggs that I might be forgetting to ask 
ofuh, Mr. Afii? 
DB: No I think you covered it. 
KJ: Let me look over my notes bnefly bare with me. As far as back to the reference 
of lying to the investigator, can you think of anything else that you might have 
lied about other than uh, your relationship with Joe? 
SA: No. 
KJ: And uh, letting him out of the church that night? 
SA: No 
KJ: He slept at your house rather than let him out at the church and also. . 
SA: Anything that has to do with that. 
KJ: You didn't want the detective to know how close you actually were to Joseph at 
that point? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay. And at no time when you were under oath, when you gave that statement 
to that investigator, is that correct? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Under oath is when you, as you raised your hand on the stand, on the witness 
stand, that is an oath. 
15 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And they didn't ask you to take an oath when you uh, met with them and gave 
them a statement? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay. I think that is about it. Mr Biggs? 
DB: That's fine. 
KJ: All right. This will terminate the interview with um, Mr. George Afu and his 
attorney, David Biggs. Time right now is 11:00 on July 18th 
SERGEANT KEVIN JUDD 
Date: July 18, 2001 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
Case No. 001917415 
Hon. Judith S. Atherton 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial came before the Court for argument on 
September 7, 2001 at 2:00 pm. The defendant was not present, having been transported 
to the Utah State Pnson unbeknownst to the Court and counsel. However, defendant's 
counsel, Paul Gotay, was present and requested that the motion be heard despite the 
defendant's absence. The State was present and represented by Sirena M. Wissler, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. The Court, having presided over the trial, 
reviewed the memoranda submitted by each party, and heard oral argument, hereby 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery, both First 
Degree Felonies, following an incident that occurred at Beto's restaurant on 
February 26, 2000. Both counts of Aggravated Robbery carried group 
enhancements, as it was alleged that in committing the offenses, defendant 
acted in concert with two or more persons. 
2. Defendant was represented by Paul Gotay, who promptly filed both a Notice 
of Appearance of Counsel and Request for Discovery. 
3. The State promptly responded to defendant's Request for Discovery and 
provided, among other things, a transcript of an interview conducted with 
George "Siaosi" Afu. 
4. Co-defendant Konai Bloomfield had already been convicted by a jury of two 
counts of Aggravated Robbery with group enhancements. The other co-
defendant, Siaosi "George" Afu (hereafter "George Afu"), was offered a plea 
bargain. He pled guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony, in exchange for his agreement to testify against Bloomfield and 
Langi. 
5. Defendant Langi was tried before ajury beginning on April 25, 2001. 
6. During the defendant's trial, the State introduced as evidence a videotape of 
the events that occurred at Beto's restaurant February 26, 2001 
7. Defendant did not object to the admission of the videotape. Rather, 
defendant utilized the videotape, arguing at trial that the videotape showed 
that while the victims were certainly beaten, they were not robbed. 
8 As part of its case-in-chief, the State called George Afu to testify, who 
testified under oath as to the events of February 26, 2000, and his role in the 
events that occurred at Beto's on that night. 
9 Defendant had been notified well in advance of tnal that the State intended to 
call George Afu as a witness as part of its case-in-chief. 
10 Dunng his testimony, Afu admitted that when police initially interviewed 
him, he was untruthful about his relationship with defendant Langi He 
testified that he had told police that he had only met Langi the night of the 
cnme, when in fact, he had known Langi for some time. 
11 George Afu also testified that he had been offered a plea bargain and had 
pled guilty to a reduced charge of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony, in exchange for testifying against defendant Langi. 
12. At the time he entered his plea, Afu, who was then represented by David C 
Biggs, executed a "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel, and 
Order" That document was wntten in English. 
13 In executing the Statement of Defendant, Afu acknowledged that he could 
"read and understand the English language," or that "an interpreter has been 
provided to me." 
14. George Afu testified that he had participated in assaulting Jose Fanas and 
Gabnel Calvillo, and that when defendant Langi got into his car, Langi 
appeared to be holding a wallet and money with blood on it. George Afu 
indicated that he had not seen Langi take the wallet, because Afu had already 
left the restaurant to go get the car 
15 On cross-examination, George Afu was asked whether it was the detectives 
who interviewed him who first raised the issue of the bloody money Afu 
indicated that he could not remember. When shown one portion of the 
transcript of that interview, Afu stated that it was the detectives who raised 
the issue. On re-direct, and upon being shown an earlier portion of the 
transcript, Afu acknowledged that it was he who first notified detectives that 
he had seen defendant Langi holding bloody money. 
16. Afu was also questioned on cross-examination about the plea bargain he had 
received in exchange for his agreement to testify against defendant Langi 
He was shown a copy of the Statement of Defendant he had executed in 
connection with his plea, and acknowledged that it indeed bore his signature. 
17. After the State rested, defendant indicated that he did not wish to take the 
stand in his own behalf. Defendant called no other witnesses. 
18. At the conclusion of the two-day trial, and following slightly more than two 
hours of deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as 
charged on both counts of Aggravated Robbery, and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that in committing the offenses, the defendant had acted in 
concert with two or more persons, subjecting him to the group enhancement. 
19. Defendant was sentenced on June 11, 2001. This Court imposed two 
indeterminate terms of 9 years to life, and ordered that the two terms run 
concurrently and not consecutively. 
20. Defendant then timely filed a Motion for New Trial, attached to which were 
what purported to be affidavits from three people: George Afu, Samuel 
Misini, and Fineeva Maka. 
21. The affidavit of George Afu contains a statement indicating that he "lied on 
the investigator's report/' and that "because of the prosecutor's pushing, and 
coaching questions, I have to lie." The affidavit bears George Afu's 
signature and was notarized on May 23, 2001. 
22. The affidavit of Samuel Misini contains a statement indicating that George 
Afu told him "he has to lie in court, because of the prosecutor's pushing, and 
coaching questions." The Misini affidavit further claimed that George Afu 
told Minisi that "it was the prosecutor and the investigator who told him 
about the stolen items, but he did not see Joe took or stolen [sic] anything 
from the victims, because he has left first to pick up the vehicle." 
23. In his memorandum in support of his motion for new trial, defendant Langi 
alleged that the affidavit of George Afu contained an admission that Afu had 
perjured himself during the trial. He later characterized the discovery of 
Afu's "perjury" as newly discovered evidence. 
24. Based upon the allegations leveled in defendant's memorandum, the State 
contacted George Afu's attorney, David C. Biggs. Mr. Biggs and Afu agreed 
to an interview on the subject of the perjury allegation. 
25. During the interview, Afu was read his Miranda rights, and informed that he 
was under investigation for perjury. Afu agreed to waive his right to remain 
silent, and agreed to speak with Sergeant Kevin Judd. David Biggs was 
present during the entire interview. 
26. David Biggs informed Sgt. Judd, on behalf of his client, that Afu does not 
read English well. He indicated that at the time Afu signed the affidavit 
which defendant attributed to him, he was not able to read the big words, and 
that his wife had paraphrased it but apparently not read the document word 
for word. 
27. Afu admitted to having signed the affidavit, but indicated that he did not 
understand what it said. 
28. Afu indicated that he believed that in the affidavit, he was only admitting that 
he had not been truthful to investigators when he was asked about his 
relationship with defendant Langi. 
29. Afu stated that he did not lie to police or anyone else about anything 
pertaining to the events that occurred at Beto's Restaurant on February 26, 
2000. 
30. Afu vehemently denied on several occasions during his interview with Sgt. 
Judd that he had lied to the jury during defendant Langi's trial. 
31. Afu further denied that any State prosecutor had ever coached him as to his 
answer to any question, and further indicated that he had not been pressured 
or coerced. Afu's counsel confirmed that he had been present during the 
prosecutors' meetings with his client, and had never witnessed any such 
inappropriate behavior on the part of the State's attorneys. 
32 Afu affirmatively stated that he had been truthful when he testified at 
defendant Langi's trial 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The revelation in the affidavit of George Afu that he lied to investigators does 
not constitute newly discovered evidence. All of the matters about which Afu 
admitted lying were matters know to the defendant at the time of trial. 
Defendant was certainly aware of the fact that he had known Afu prior to 
February 26, 2000, and was similarly aware that he had spent the night over 
at Afu's house on the night of February 26, 2000. Moreover, because 
defendant was present at the time the cnmes at Beto's were committed, any 
discrepancies between Afu's version of events and his own were certainly 
know to defendant prior to tnal. Because these matters were known to 
defendant prior to tnal, they do not constitute newly discovered evidence 
2. The affidavit of George Afu, submitted by defendant, is on its face, 
insufficient to establish that Afu testified falsely at tnal. Despite defendant's 
characterization of it, the affidavit does not contain an admission by Afu that 
he lied on the witness stand when he testified at defendant's tnal To the 
contrary, the affidavit indicates only that Afu lied to investigators, a fact 
which he admitted to the jury. Defendant's assertion that Afu perjured 
himself at trial is, therefore, unsupported. 
3 The affidavits of Samuel Misim and Fmeeva Maka are double hearsay and 
are so unreliable that this Court declines to consider them when evaluating 
defendant's motion for new tnal. 
4. Defense counsel had ample opportunity, prior to trial, to conduct an interview 
with George Afu in order to ascertain any information that as not a part of the 
formal interview conducted by police. Therefore, any information disclosed 
during trial about which defense counsel had no prior knowledge could have, 
with due diligence, been discovered prior to trial. 
5. Defendant's trial counsel conducted a competent cross-examination of 
George Afu which appropriately addressed the issue of the plea agreement he 
had reached with prosecutors in exchange for his testimony, and on the fact 
that because he had left the restaurant prior to the robbery, Afu did not 
actually witness defendant Langi removing or attempting to remove any 
property from the victims. 
6. Based upon the transcript of Sergeant Kevin Judd's interview with George 
Afu, this Court finds that George Afu did not perjure himself during 
defendant Langi's trial. Any inconsistencies in his statements, or bias that 
may have arisen as a result of Afu's plea agreement with the State, were 
properly explored on cross-examination. 
7. Also based upon this Court's review of the transcript of Sgt. Judd's interview 
with George Afu, this Court is satisfied that no representative of the State 
coached George Afu regarding his testimony, nor was George Afu coerced or 
pressured by any representative of the State. 
8. Notwithstanding defendant's argument to the contrary, the evidence of 
defendant's guilt in this case was overwhelming. The videotape admitted 
into evidence, which captured the offenses in progress, provided sufficient 
evidence to convict defendant That video, particularly when coupled with 
the testimony of Jose Farias, Gabriel Calvillo, Rachel Redding, and George 
Afu, was so compelling that it makes the likelihood of a different result 
extremely remote. That is, even if this Court were to determine that some 
newly discovered evidence existed which could not have been discovered 
with due diligence prior to trial, that new evidence would not make a 
different result probable at a new tnai. 
9 Because this Court was not provided a transcnpt or other recording of George 
Afu's guilty plea in connection with his own involvement in the events that 
occurred at Beto's on February 26, 2000, this Court did not consider any 
issue related to the entry of that plea in reaching these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
This Court hereby enters the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on the issue of defendant's Motion for New Trial. Based upon those findings, and for the 
reasons enumerated above, defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
DATED this I'j day of j/JHi d* . Jt± 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for Defendant Joseph Langi 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 6ch day of February, 2002, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Joseph Jardine, Attorney 
for Defendant Joseph Langi, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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